St. John's Law Review
Volume 39
Number 2 Volume 39, May 1965, Number 2

Article 48

CPLR 3019(c): Setoff Counterclaim on Assigned Claim
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

195]

BIANNUAL SURVEY

This case highlights the problem of whether a practitioner can
determine the statutory cause of his dismissal if the court is not
explicit. Neither Houle nor Flannery comes to grips with this
problem. Both illustrate the need for some judicial determination
so that the practitioner can judge how long a delay will change
a 3012 dismissal into a 3216 dismissal, and thereby cause a
plaintiff to lose the six-month extension granted by CPLR 205.171
CPLR 3019(c): Setoff counterclaim on assigned claim.
Until 1936 the Civil Practice Act divided counterclaims into
two categories: the setoff and the recoupment.1 2 The setoff could
be asserted by an obligor against a plaintiff if the claim matured
before assignment, and if defendant had knowledge of the claim
prior to notice of the assignment. On the other hand, a recoupment
7 3
counterclaim could be asserted although maturing after assignment.
After 1936 there was some doubt as to whether an amendment
to the section eliminated this division. CPLR 3019(c) retained
this confusion. All doubt was ended in 1964 by the court of
appeals which, in the case of James Talcott, Inc. v. Winco Sales
Corp.,27 4 confirmed the recoupment-setoff distinction.
In the recent appellate division case of Chatham Sec. Corp.
v. J.R. Williston & Beane,175 defendant asserted a claim against
the plaintiff arising out of a separate transaction with plaintiff's
principal-assignor. That case was resolved on principles of agency.
The court held that "itis well-established law that an agent who
acquires an interest in his principal's contract takes subject to
defenses available against this principal even as any assignee ..... 176
With the case so resolved, the court chose to discuss plaintiff's
contention that it was an assignee. 7 7 The court indicated that the
counterclaim was a setoff since it arose from a transaction other
than the one sued upon by the plaintiff.
Since the court acknowledged that the counterclaim was a setoff, the dictates of Talcott demanded that it could only be raised
against the plaintiff if it existed prior to the assignnent, and if
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For an excellent illustration of the lack of clarity that marks this

area see Simmons v. New York City Transit Authority (Sup. Ct. Kings
County) 153 N.Y.L.J., March 5, 1965, p. 18, col. 2.
.72CPA § 266 as amended.
'173CPA§ 267 as amended.

174 14 N.Y.2d 227, 199 N.E.2d 499, 250 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1964).
This case
is analyzed in The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JOHN's
L. REv. 181, 182-83 (1964).
175

22 App. Div. 2d 260, 254 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1st Dep't 1964).

76 Id.at 265, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
177After indicating that Chatham was liable for the setoff, the court
introduced its conclusion as to plaintiff's rights as an assignee: "If

Chatham is treated as an assignee of Arlee, its position is worsened."
Ibid.
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defendant had notice of the setoff prior to notice of the assignment.
Whether it had in fact existed prior to the assignment was not
examined by the court.""8 Rather, the court indicated, somewhat
inaccurately, that,
an assignee is subject to setoffs available against the assignor whenever
the setoffs are based on facts existing prior to knowledge by the obligor
179
of the assignment.

The court failed to cite Talcott and, in addition, indicated that its
statement was inconsistent with CPLR 3019(c) 1o and with

several prior decisions.' 81
Although the decision would not have been altered by a
proper pronouncement of the court, such inaccuracy must be
indicated. Imprecise dicta can only serve to confuse practitioners
as to the exact nature of the setoff counterclaim.
Reply allowed to state what appears to be a counterclaim.

A reply is the pleading, designated by CPLR 3011, to be
A reply may also be
served in response to a counterclaim.
required, in other circumstances,' 82 by court order.8 3 It has
been firmly established that only defenses and denials may be
84
pleaded in a reply regardless of why the reply was served.
178 "The Court need not decide, and the record does not establish, whether
the bonds [from which transaction the setoff arose] were delivered to Arlee
before or after receipt of the securities from, and delivery of the check to,
Meadow Brook on May 26, although both events took place on the same
day. The important fact is that it was not until after delivery of bonds
• . . that it was revealed to the broker [defendant] that Chatham [plaintiff]
•

. .

had obtained an interest in its principal's securities." Ibid.

17 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
18o Ibid.

181 Fera v. Wickham, 135 N.Y. 223, 31 N.E. 1028 (1892); Michigan
Say. Bank v. Millar, 110 App. Div. 670, 96 N.Y. Supp. 568 (1st Dep't), aff'd,
606, 79 N.E. 1111 (1906).
186 N.Y.
182 An affirmative defense may be one such circumstance. E.g., Palmer v.
Anderson, 243 App. Div. 618, 276 N.Y. Supp. 478 (2d Dep't 1935).
183 CPLR 3011.
See, e.g., Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Corn Exch. Bank,
73 Hun 78, 25 N.Y. Supp. 1068 (Sup. Ct 1893).
184 Although the provisions of the procedure statutes have not explicitly
restricted the inclusion of counterclaims in a reply, courts have never been
hesitant to infer this restriction. The restriction was present under the
Code of Civil Procedure § 514 as illustrated in Cohn v. Husson, 66 How.
Pr. 150 (N.Y. City Ct 1883). In Seligmann v. Mandel, 19 Misc. 2d 418,
190 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1959), the court held that under CPA §272,
counterclaims were not includible in a reply. The provisions of CPA § 272
are now embodied in Sections 3011, 3014 and 3018(a) of the CPLI. This
division has not changed the policy of excluding counterclaims. See, e.g.,
Habiby v. Habiby, - App. Div. 2d -, 256 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1st Dep't 1965);
In re Cohen (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) 150 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1963, p. 12,
col. 4.

